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Unanimously Wrong
Dale Carpenter*
The Supreme Court was unanimously wrong in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.1
Though rare, it is not the first time the Court has been unanimously
wrong. Its most notorious such decisions have come, like FAIR, in
cases where the Court conspicuously failed even to appreciate the
importance of the constitutional freedoms under attack from legislative majorities.2 In these cases, the Court’s very rhetoric exposed its
myopic vision in ways that now seem embarrassing. Does FAIR, so
obviously correct to so many people right now, await the same
ignominy decades away?
FAIR was wrong in tone, a dismissive vox populi, adopted by a
Court seeming to reflect and reinforce popular reactions to the case.
But most importantly, FAIR was wrong in rationale, which is worse
than getting a single result wrong. Not very much of practical significance for the whole country ordinarily hinges on the result in a
single case settling the claim of a single litigant or group of litigants.
*Julius E. Davis Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
Jordan Reilly for research assistance.
1
126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
2
For examples of decisions that were unanimous but have since been widely criticized either for their results or their rationales, see Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873) (unanimously upholding state law excluding women from the
practice of law); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (unanimously
upholding state law denying women the right to vote); Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47 (1919) (unanimously upholding convictions for anti-war speech under the
Espionage Act of 1917); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (unanimously
upholding conviction of Eugene Debs for political-convention speech praising draft
resisters); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (unanimously upholding
conviction for violating curfew order applicable only to persons of Japanese ancestry).
I emphasize that not all of these decisions were necessarily wrong in result. See, for
example, Jim Chen’s excellent discussion of why Minor v. Happersett was correctly
decided on his blog at Jurisdynamics, Totally Mistaken, Never in Doubt, at http:
jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/07/totally-mistaken-never-in-doubt.html (last
visited July 19, 2006).
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Whether law schools may exclude military recruiters who, following
federal ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ (DADT) policy, discriminate against
gay law students does not matter that much to most people. The
decision may even have the paradoxical effect of advancing the
antidiscrimination cause by forcing conscientious law schools to
make plain their opposition to anti-gay discrimination in the military; a decision in the law schools’ favor would have allowed them
to relax on the issue.3
But the rationale justifying the result in a single case can have
significant consequences because it can affect decisions in the future.
In FAIR, the Supreme Court botched several doctrines in its ordinarily libertarian free-speech jurisprudence, including the foundational question of what counts as protected speech, and it botched
them all in a way that could constrict liberty. Whether FAIR has
harmful long-term effects for speech awaits future decisions, but
Chief Justice John Roberts’ first major constitutional decision gives
us some reason to worry.
The fact of unanimity—it was 8-0 and likely would have been 9-0
if Justice Samuel Alito had participated4 —does not make the decision
less wrong. If it is indeed wrong, unanimity only makes its wrongness more egregious, putting in very stark relief the failure of even
a single justice on the current Court to overcome the passions of the
moment in order to safeguard constitutional freedoms.5 Instead of
defending liberty, the Court’s conservatives apparently saw a chance
to defend military honor against law-school elites. Its liberals apparently saw a chance to defend government power while proving they
can be cold-eyed realists on matters of national security.
3
Amy Kapczynski, Queer Brinkmanship: Citizenship and the Solomon Wars, 112
Yale L.J. 673, 674 (2002) (‘‘The military also may have done universities a favor by
returning them to their heritage of dissent: Forced to relinquish the accommodations
upon which they relied to manage the conflict, universities and law schools now
have little choice but simply to confront it.’’).
4
Justice Alito was not confirmed until after oral argument in FAIR.
5
For those who approve the decision, unanimity makes the result more obviously
right. ‘‘The decision was so obviously right,’’ observed Professor Tom McCoy, ‘‘that
it had to be unanimous unless some member of the Court was incapable of reasoning
through the well-established doctrines that controlled the case.’’ David L. Hudson,
Jr., Law Schools Told to Allow Military Recruiters, 5 ABA Journal Report 10 (Mar.
10, 2006). Whether FAIR was really the product of ‘‘well-established doctrines,’’ or
an amendment to them, is the subject of this article.
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Chief Justice Roberts prides himself on striving for ‘‘unanimity
or near unanimity’’ in order to ‘‘promote clarity and guidance’’ to
the legal community and to decide cases ‘‘on the narrowest possible
ground.’’6 FAIR seems clear in at least one sense: Congress clearly
may force schools to admit military recruiters if it chooses to do so.
Whether deciding the case on this basis was the ‘‘narrowest possible
ground’’ for decision is a different matter. Neither clarity nor narrowness, furthermore, can salvage error.
FAIR was not necessarily wrong in its ultimate result, upholding
the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment. 7 Perhaps, for
example, the government really could show a close connection
between recruitment needs and a policy of withdrawing federal
funds from entire universities whose law schools defend their antidiscrimination principles by excluding military recruiters. That is a
possibility I do not explore here, as the courts in this litigation did
not explore it, and Congress has never held a single hearing regarding the alleged recruitment need for the Solomon Amendment.
Let me get one other preliminary issue out of the way. My grandfather served in the Pacific in World War II and lived with the wounds
of that conflict for the rest of his life. My father served in the U.S.
Army in Germany at the height of Cold War tensions over the
building of the Berlin Wall. I have nothing but respect for this country’s armed forces and especially for those who serve. Much as I
disagree with DADT as a matter of policy, and much as I abhor its
needless cruelty to gay Americans who want to serve their country,
I probably could not have voted as a law school faculty member to
bar military recruiters from our premises. Nevertheless, I support
law schools’ efforts to protest and call attention to DADT, and I
believe that law schools should have the option to bar recruiters if
they choose to do so. They should have this option free of either
direct federal coercion enforced by criminal penalty or indirect coercion enforced by loss of almost all federal funding.
In Part I, I briefly describe some relevant background about the
Solomon Amendment and the litigation challenging it. The Solomon
Amendment began modestly, involving only Defense Department
6

James Taranto, Getting to Yes, Wall St. J., July 1, 2006, at A11 (quoting Chief
Justice Roberts).
7
10 U.S.C. § 983 (2005).
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funds, but quickly metastasized. In Part II, I discuss the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, an important issue raised by the Solomon
Amendment and likely to figure prominently in the future of liberty
and federalism but one that is left mostly untouched by FAIR. In Part
III, I analyze the Court’s treatment of free speech and the freedom of
association. On free speech, the Court unsuccessfully distinguished
its compelled-speech cases and seemingly narrowed the reach of its
third-party speech cases. It also minted a test for expressive conduct
based on ‘‘inherent expressiveness’’ that is either completely
unworkable or extremely narrow. On the freedom of association,
the Court narrowed its jurisprudence largely to concerns about membership and seemingly dropped any deference to an association’s
own judgment about whether compliance with state regulation
would significantly impair its message. Both of these holdings are
a break with the Court’s precedents. There was an abundance of
commentary on the Solomon Amendment and its constitutionality
before FAIR.8 It is not my purpose to rehash all of the constitutional
arguments here. Instead, my focus is on the decision itself and its
possible implications.
I. Background
A. The Solomon Amendment
In the 1970s, educational institutions began adding ‘‘sexual orientation’’ to policies prohibiting various forms of discrimination. As
8
See, e.g., Diane H. Mazur, A Blueprint for Law School Engagement With the
Military, 1 J. Nat’l Security L. & Pol’y 473 (2005) (noting the symbolic nature of the
arguments for the law and criticizing judicial deference to military judgment); John
C. Eastman, Is the Solomon Amendment ‘‘F.A.I.R.’’? Some Thoughts on Congress’s
Power to Impose this Condition on Federal Spending, 50 Vill. L. Rev. 1171 (2005)
(arguing that the Solomon Amendment is within congressional power); Gerald Walpin, The Solomon Amendment is Constitutional and Does Not Violate Academic
Freedom, 2 Seton Hall Circuit Rev. 1 (2005) (arguing that the law serves the expressive
purpose of getting the military’s message to law students); Abigail K. Holland, The
High Price of Equality: The Effect of the Solomon Amendment on Law Schools’ First
Amendment Rights, 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 855 (2005) (arguing that the Solomon
Amendment is unconstitutional under the First Amendment); Andrew P. Morriss,
The Market for Legal Education & Freedom of Association: Why the ‘‘Solomon
Amendment’’ is Constitutional and Law Schools Are Not Expressive Associations,
14 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 415 (2005) (arguing that law schools operate primarily as
economic cartels, not as expressive associations); Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Challenging the Wisdom of Solomon: The First Amendment and Military Recruitment
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part of this expansion of antidiscrimination policies, law schools
required prospective employers recruiting students in their facilities
to agree not to discriminate on the basis of several criteria, including
sexual orientation. They did this both on their own initiative and in
compliance with the guidelines of the American Association of Law
Schools. The new on-campus recruitment policies meant excluding
recruiters from the military, which by longstanding policy barred
homosexual servicemembers.
In response to these developments, in 1994 Congress passed the
Solomon Amendment, named after its primary sponsor, U.S. Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY). The legislation arose during a
period of heightened attention to the role of gays in the military
prompted by President Bill Clinton’s proposal to let openly gay
people serve. (Congress ultimately codified the ban on gays in the
military under DADT that same year.) Congress held no hearings
on the need for the Solomon Amendment and the Department of
Defense initially opposed it as ‘‘unnecessary.’’9
The Solomon Amendment originally mandated only that ‘‘[n]o
funds available to the Department of Defense may be provided by
grant or contract to any institution of higher education that has a
policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of
Defense from obtaining for military recruiting purposes . . . entry to
campuses or access to students on campuses.’’10
From that narrow beginning, the Solomon Amendment metastasized. In subsequent years, the funding condition was expanded to
include funds available to universities from the Departments of
Homeland Security, Health and Human Services, Labor, Education,
and Transportation, as well as the National Security Agency and
the Central Intelligence Agency. Congress also clarified that the
condition applied to an entire university even if only a ‘‘subelement’’
within the university (e.g., a university’s law school) denied access
on Campus, 13 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 205 (2004) (arguing that the speech interests
of the law schools outweigh those of the military); Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s
Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 T. Marshall L. Rev. 351 (1998) (suggesting
strategies for law schools to ameliorate the presence of military recruiters before the
‘‘equal access’’ requirement was added to the law).
9

140 Cong. Rec. 11,440 (1994) (statement of Rep. Underwood).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337,
§ 558, 108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
10
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to military recruiters. Finally, in 2004, Congress further required
that, under the funding condition, military recruiters must be given
access to the institution ‘‘that is at least equal in quality and scope
to the access to campuses and to students that is provided to any
other employer.’’11 At no point during this metastasizing process
did Congress or anyone else show an actual recruitment need for
the law.
As it now stands, the Solomon Amendment puts at risk tens of
billions of dollars in funding annually to universities.12 The money
goes to many causes, like important scientific and medical research.
Under the current version of the law, even law schools that do
not themselves receive federal funds from any of the agencies and
departments covered by the Solomon Amendment have reluctantly
agreed to allow military recruiters in their facilities.
B. The Litigation
In September 2003, a group of law schools and faculties organized
as the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (FAIR) brought
suit in a New Jersey federal district court against Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and other department heads whose departmental
funding to universities is subject to the recruitment condition. FAIR
argued that the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment rights. The district court denied FAIR’s request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement.
On appeal, a divided panel of the Third Circuit held that FAIR
was likely to prevail on its First Amendment claims, and directed
the district court to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.
However, on January 20, 2005, the Third Circuit granted the government’s request to stay its decision pending appeal to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court granted the government’s petition for

11

Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub.
L. No. 108-375, § 552, 118 Stat. 1811, 1911 (2004).
12
In fiscal year 2003, the amount of federal funding to universities covered by the
Solomon Amendment was almost $35 billion. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the American Association of University Professors in Support of Respondents at 23, Rumsfeld
v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152) (hereinafter AAUP Amicus Brief) (calculating amount based on total federal funding for universities ($57.5 billion) minus noncovered student aid ($23 billion)). In 2004, the law jeopardized $351 million in research
funding for the University of Minnesota alone.
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writ of certiorari on May 2, 2005, and heard oral argument in December 2005.
C. The Arguments
Before the Supreme Court, FAIR argued that an educational institution’s decision to bar military recruiters is constitutionally protected, both as an expression of moral and professional disapproval
of anti-gay discrimination and as an exercise of associational freedom. These constitutional interests are especially important in a
setting, like a university, where academic freedom is paramount.
Central to the arguments was the Court’s 2000 decision in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale,13 in which the Court held that the Boy
Scouts had an associational right to exclude an openly gay scoutmaster despite a state law barring discrimination against gays.
The government distinguished Dale by noting that the Solomon
Amendment does not affect the composition of the schools’ membership; the recruiters’ presence is only temporary and episodic. Further, the government argued that unlike Dale, the case did not
involve an attempt by the state to convey any message about service
by gays in the military. Everyone understands that recruiters speak
only for their employers and not for the schools in which they recruit,
argued the government.14
FAIR responded that the freedom of association recognized in Dale
was indeed implicated. The Solomon Amendment, FAIR claimed,
violates the schools’ freedom of association by infringing their ‘‘right
to choose for themselves which causes to assist or resist.’’ The freedom of association is not limited to the ability to control membership
in an organization, FAIR argued, but extends to the full range of
associational activities by which a group aids or refuses to aid a
cause.15
The parties also disagreed over whether the Solomon Amendment
unconstitutionally compelled speech by the universities. The government argued that it did not, since it simply does not force schools
to send the message that they agree with the military’s exclusion of
13

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Brief for Petitioners at 12, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152)
(hereinafter Petitioners’ Brief).
15
Brief for the Respondents at 30–35, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No.
04-1152) (hereinafter ‘‘Respondents’ Brief’’).
14
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gays.16 FAIR countered that the Solomon Amendment does compel
speech. It requires the schools to serve military recruiters affirmatively through quintessential ‘‘speech’’ activities, like distributing,
posting, and printing literature announcing the presence of the
recruiters; introducing students to the government; and sponsoring
private fora for the exchange of information (the recruiting interview
sessions themselves). This, argued FAIR, requires a school ‘‘to disseminate, carry, or host a message against its will.’’17
The parties also disagreed over whether the law schools’ prohibition on military recruiters could be considered ‘‘speech.’’ The government argued that the schools’ action is not a form of ‘‘expressive
conduct’’ protected under the intermediate scrutiny standard of
United States v. O’Brien.18 Refusing to give recruiters equal access to
facilities, argued the government, is not inherently expressive. It is
merely conduct, and as such does not enjoy any First Amendment
speech protection.
FAIR responded that, on the contrary, the schools’ refusal to allow
employers who discriminate to recruit is part of their overall message
that such discrimination is immoral and unprofessional. Barring
recruiters who discriminate is a way to ‘‘punctuate’’ a school’s message by refusing to assist discrimination, FAIR asserted.19
Finally, the parties disagreed at length over whether the Solomon
Amendment violates the ‘‘unconstitutional conditions’’ doctrine,
under which the government generally may not condition the receipt
of a government benefit on the relinquishment of a constitutional
right. FAIR emphasized that the Solomon Amendment places a
‘‘penalty’’ on the exercise of First Amendment rights and thus violates the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. This is not a case,
noted FAIR, where the government has simply required that certain
funds be used only for the purpose for which they are provided
(e.g., the government may require that education funds be spent on
education). Instead, the Solomon Amendment attempts a sweeping
denial of almost all federal assistance to an entire educational institution merely because one part of it—a part that might itself receive
16

See
See
18
391
19
See
17
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Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 14, at 20–22.
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 15, at 21–28.
U.S. 367 (1968).
Respondents’ Brief, supra note 15, at 28–30.
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no federal money—refuses to allow the military to recruit.20 The
government maintained that since it would be free to compel the
schools to admit military recruiters, and that such a requirement
would not itself violate the First Amendment, it could take the less
drastic step of simply encouraging compliance through a funding
condition.21
II. Unconstitutional Conditions After FAIR
Before the decision in FAIR was announced, constitutional law
professors might have been a bit anxious. Law school faculties wanting to enforce their antidiscrimination policies by barring military
recruiters had been prominently and widely denounced as out-oftouch and unpatriotic,22 practically mocking the soldiers who guard
them while they sleep.23 A decision against the law schools might
be taken as partial vindication of this view. But for myself, I was
not anxious because the Court might uphold the law. It always
seemed likely that the Court would do so in a time of high national
stress and real danger. Even if the Supreme Court ruled unanimously
against the law schools challenging the law, that was no cause for
anxiety by itself.
No, the fear was that the Supreme Court might actually decide
the hardest and most interesting question in the litigation: whether
the Solomon Amendment violated the notoriously under-theorized
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The most succinct formulation
of the doctrine holds that the ‘‘government may not grant a benefit
on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right,

20
21

Id. at 37–38.
See Petitioners’ Brief, supra note 14, at 40–43.

22

‘‘While Americans in uniform are engaged around the world in the global war
on terror, the idea that academic elites would bar military recruiters from campus
runs against the very ethos of patriotism.’’ Statement of House Armed Services
Committee Chairman Duncan Hunter, R-Cal., on U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Allowing Military Recruiters Access to College Campuses, available at http://www.
house.gov/hasc/pressreleases/13-6-06HunterStatementMilitaryRecruiters.pdf (last
visited Aug. 29, 2006).
23
The phrase comes from Rudyard Kipling, via George Orwell: ‘‘It would be difficult
to hit off the one-eyed pacifism of the English in fewer words than in the phrase,
‘making mock of uniforms that guard you while you sleep.’’’ George Orwell, The
Orwell Reader 274 (Harcourt Brace 1984).
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even if the government may withhold that benefit altogether.’’24 This
simple statement of the doctrine masks huge complexities that have
vexed our brightest constitutional theorists.25
Much of the popular reaction to Rumsfeld v. FAIR prior to the
decision suggested that this part of the case was easy: ‘‘If you don’t
want to let military recruiters on your campus, don’t take the money.
If you want the money, let the military recruit. There can be no
constitutional problem putting schools to that choice.’’ But this part
of the case was never as easy as that reaction suggested. I will not,
here, offer a theory of unconstitutional conditions. Instead, I will
point out some of the difficulties in the doctrine, discuss the Court’s
brief treatment of it, and point to some problems it presents for
constitutional law in the future.
A. Some Problems in the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine
In 1958, the Court held in Speiser v. Randall that a state could not
require veterans otherwise eligible for property tax exemptions to
swear that they did not advocate forcible overthrow of the government.26 Threatening the veterans with this economic loss—to which
they had no independent constitutional entitlement—amounted to
an unconstitutional ‘‘penalty’’ on the exercise of their First Amendment right not to swear loyalty to the government. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine was born. A tangle of other precedents
ensued, with no clear analytical framework emerging.27
In this unstable environment, it is not difficult to imagine cases
that test the constitutional line. If the government may deny an
24

Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1415,
1415 (1989).
25
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Supreme Court 1987 Term: Unconstitutional
Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 5 (1988);
Sullivan, supra note 24; David Cole, Beyond Unconstitutional Conditions: Charting
Spheres of Neutrality in Government-Funded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675 (1992).
26
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958).
27
Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (Congress
may deny tax deductions for contributions to a lobbying organization); FCC v. League
of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (Congress may not cut off funding to
broadcasting station that engages in on-air editorializing); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991) (Congress may require federal health funding recipients not to counsel
patients about abortion); Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (Congress may not deny funding to lawyers in federal legal aid program who counsel
clients to challenge existing welfare laws).
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entire university all funding (e.g., cancer research funding) because
one part of the university exercises a constitutional right to bar
military recruiters, could it similarly leverage its economic power
to require the university to allow a military officer on campus to
deliver the government’s message about the need for high defense
spending? Could it threaten to withdraw all university funding
unless the university agreed to forgo its right to ‘‘ameliorate’’ the
recruiters’ presence on campus (e.g., by posting written notices outside the interview room indicating the school’s disagreement with
the military’s exclusion of gays)?
On the one hand, under the Court’s precedents the federal government could not decide to distribute food stamps (an elective government benefit) only to people who agree not to criticize the war in
Iraq (which they have a constitutional right to do). On the other
hand, the government can decide to give money to people to send
their children to public schools (an elective government benefit) but
not to private schools (which they have a constitutional right to send
their children to). Surely this is not unconstitutionally conditioning
funds. How would the Court draw the line in a way that did not
seem result-oriented and ad hoc?
The problems get thornier the more one thinks about them. If the
government cannot condition funding to universities to encourage
them to admit military recruiters, as FAIR argued, could it continue
to condition funding on a school’s agreement not to discriminate
against students or employees on the basis of race or sex (as it now
does through civil rights laws)? Or is there some way to distinguish
the conditional funding embedded in civil rights law from the Solomon Amendment?
This latter issue worried a great many liberal legal commentators
who ordinarily oppose state-sponsored anti-gay discrimination, like
DADT and the Solomon Amendment, but were afraid that a ruling
in FAIR’s favor on the unconstitutional conditions issue might
endanger civil rights laws involving funding conditions.28 Amicus

28
See, e.g., Tobias Barrington Wolff, ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ Harms the Constitution,
but So Does This Cure, L.A. Times, May 15, 2005, at M5 (decrying DADT as ‘‘irrational’’
and the Solomon Amendment as ‘‘outrageous’’ but suggesting the case ‘‘could undermine decades of progressive legislation’’ protecting women and minorities from
discrimination).
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briefs on FAIR’s side labored to distinguish the Solomon Amendment from antidiscrimination laws like Titles VI and IX.29 My purpose here is not to suggest a resolution of these difficulties, but to
call attention to them. Their very complexity may lead the Court to
avoid the doctrine in ways inhospitable to underlying liberty claims,
as I suggest below.
B. The Step Not Taken in FAIR
Every unconstitutional-conditions claim, where the government
conditions economic benefit x on forgoing or engaging in activity
y, involves two steps.
STEP 1: The litigant must establish that the government could
not directly require (e.g., through a criminal penalty) the
litigant to forgo or engage in activity y.
STEP 2: The litigant must establish that it is unconstitutional
to condition the availability of economic benefit x on the
litigant’s forgoing or engaging in activity y.

The unconstitutional conditions litigant must win on both steps in
order to prevail; the government need only win on one.
In Rumsfeld v. FAIR, activity y was prohibiting the military to
recruit on campus. Economic benefit x was a vast array of government funds and aid otherwise available to every part of a university.
Because FAIR lost on step one of the analysis—the government
could directly require the schools to allow the military to recruit on
campus—the Court did not address step two.
That does not quite mean that the Court said absolutely nothing
about the unconstitutional conditions issue. After noting Congress’
broad authority on matters of military recruiting, the Court laid out
what it evidently regarded as the relevant unconstitutional conditions precedents:
Congress’ power to regulate military recruiting under the
Solomon Amendment is arguably greater because universities are free to decline the federal funds. In Grove City College
29
See, e.g., AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 19, 29–30 (arguing that, unlike
the Solomon Amendment, the antidiscrimination conditions of Titles VI and IX are
not imposed for the purpose of suppressing expression and academic freedom; that
there is a nexus between the condition and the funding; and that there is a compelling
interest in antidiscrimination that is actually served by the Civil Rights Act).
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v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575–76 (1984), we rejected a private
college’s claim that conditioning federal funds on its compliance with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
violated the First Amendment. We thought this argument
‘‘warrant[ed] only brief consideration’’ because ‘‘Congress
is free to attach reasonable and unambiguous conditions to
federal financial assistance that educational institutions are
not obligated to accept.’’ Id., at 575. We concluded that no
First Amendment violation had occurred—without reviewing the substance of the First Amendment claims—because
Grove City could decline the Government’s funds. Id., at
575–576.
Other decisions, however, recognize a limit on Congress’
ability to place conditions on the receipt of funds. We recently
held that ‘‘‘the government may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
. . . freedom of speech even if he has no entitlement to that
benefit.’’’ United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194,
210 (2003) (quoting Bd. of County Comm’rs, Wabaunsee
County v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996)).30

This is a revealing choice of background precedents. One, Grove City,
is a case in which the Court did not mention the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and subjected the funding condition to a mere
‘‘reasonableness’’ requirement. The other, American Library Association, is a case in which the Court rejected a claim that it was unconstitutional for Congress to require public libraries receiving federal
funds to install anti-pornography filters on computers with Internet
access. It is an inauspicious discussion for those concerned about
Congress’ use of its economic power to curtail the exercise of rights.
However, this part of the Court’s opinion at least acknowledges
the possibility of a constitutional problem when Congress conditions
funds, something which much of the popular commentary on the
case and even a few law professors doubted pre-FAIR. It seems there
is an unconstitutional conditions doctrine, after all.
The very next sentence in the opinion offers a tantalizing hint at
what might have been: ‘‘Under this principle, known as the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, the Solomon Amendment would be
unconstitutional if Congress could not directly require universities
30

Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1306–07 (2006).
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to provide military recruiters equal access to their students.’’31 Is the
Court saying that FAIR would have won had it been able to establish
an underlying constitutional right to exclude military recruiters?
This seems the implication of the sentence, though we are not told
how the Court would have reasoned to that result in the teeth of
decisions like Grove City.
What the Court almost gives in one sentence, however, it takes
away in the very next: ‘‘This case does not require us to determine
when a condition placed on university funding goes beyond the
‘reasonable’ choice offered in Grove City and becomes an unconstitutional condition.’’32 Thus, while acknowledging the existence of the
unconstitutional conditions beast, the Court extracts its teeth. Where
Congress is conditioning funds to achieve what it could not mandate,
the Constitution requires only that the condition be ‘‘reasonable.’’
We all know what that means.
C. A Future for Unconstitutional Conditions
This entire part of the Court’s opinion, however, is dicta since the
Court decided the case on the basis of step one of the unconstitutional
conditions analysis.33 The opinion has nothing really valuable to say
about this huge area of potential constitutional litigation, an area
that has special significance in an era of annual federal budgets
approaching $3 trillion and a Congress eager to use this enormous
economic leverage to get individuals, associations, and states to do
its bidding.
To see why conditional funding is important, consider the very
context in which FAIR was decided. By any measure, an economic
actor with $3 trillion to spend every year is a powerhouse. Its decisions shape the whole economy and affect the lives of everyone in
the nation. Its power can be used to mold both the marketplace of
goods and the marketplace of ideas.
Some industries and some fields of inquiry depend for their existence on the largesse of this powerhouse. Much research in modern
universities could not proceed without federal funding. Universities
cannot afford to forgo this funding if they are to remain competitive
31

Id. at 1307.
Id.
33
Id.
32

230

Unanimously Wrong
with their peer institutions.34 Thus, universities will do everything
they can to keep the money flowing. Congress knows this and can
impose almost any condition it wants on the funds. An example is
the recently added requirement that universities spend time and
resources hosting an annual ‘‘Constitution Day’’ designed to teach
students about the Constitution—the very document that protects
the academic freedom not to teach about the Constitution.35 Another
example is the Solomon Amendment. By themselves, these sorts of
restrictions may not threaten First Amendment values like free
speech, association, and academic freedom. But cumulatively,
they do.
Congress’ economic might combined with its growing willingness
to use that might endangers two structural postulates of the Constitution: limited government and federalism. Congress is using its power
to coerce private citizens and associations to relinquish or limit the
exercise of important constitutional rights, including the right to
criticize the policies of the government itself. This is not a hallmark
of limited government. In addition, when Congress uses its leverage
against state institutions, like state universities, it is forcing them to
relinquish large areas of control to its central authority. This growth
of the federal government is something the Framers could not have
imagined. Translating the Framers’ vision of limited power and
federalism into the modern age of a federal behemoth is a challenge
for constitutionalism in this century.
Those of us concerned about federalism and liberty in the face of
Congress’ willingness to use its economic might to curtail both have
perhaps three options. First, we could argue that much of what
Congress does to condition funding is unconstitutional as being
beyond its spending power. This is almost certainly a losing argument until the Court modifies or reverses the broad congressional
spending authority recognized in South Dakota v. Dole, 3 6 an
unlikely event.
34
In fiscal year 2003, almost ten percent of universities’ expenditures were at risk
under the Solomon Amendment. See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 12, at 23.
35
For analysis suggesting that Constitution Day may be unconstitutional, see Heidi
Kitrosser, Is Constitution Day Constitutional? (Sept. 10, 2005), at http://
www.law.umn-edu/upleads/images/2085/IsConstitutionDayConstitutionaldraft2.pdf.
36
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Second, we could argue for a dramatic reduction in taxes, which
would shrink the size of the federal government and thus reduce
both the dependence on federal funds and the opportunity for mischievous funding conditions. If the first option was unlikely, this
second one is impossible. The largest tax reductions in the last fifty
years—under Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush—
have not succeeded in reducing the size of the federal budget.
The third option is to accept reality: the federal government will
remain a large, growing, and omnipresent force in our lives. We
need a realistic understanding of how government power operates
today. This power can be reined in, perhaps slightly, through robust
substantive protection for speech and association, and through an
unconstitutional conditions doctrine that fetters Congress’ ability to
eat away at federalism and liberty through funding conditions. A
constitutional theory unable to account for and deal with this threat
cannot be considered very protective of either federalism or liberty
in the 21st century.
Two other issues bearing on the unconstitutional conditions issue
warrant some mention. First, while Chief Justice Roberts believes
that unanimity encourages narrow opinions, it is not clear that the
Court’s choice was the narrowest ground available for decision. If
the Court had decided the case on the basis of step two—the way
it did in Grove City—it could have avoided any discussion of the
substantive First Amendment issues. If one believes that FAIR ended
up making no new substantive law in the First Amendment area,
the Court’s opinion does seem a minimalist one. However, if one
believes that the Court’s opinion actually contracted First Amendment liberties, or at least made them more uncertain,37 it is hardly
clear that the Court’s decision to resolve the issue on step one was
the narrowest one available.
Second, it could be that the Court’s reluctance to engage in serious
and difficult step two analysis about unconstitutional conditions
will increasingly lead it to resolve cases in step one by denying the
underlying liberty claims. If that is right, FAIR is just one manifestation of a larger problem in future constitutional litigation.

37

See discussion infra Part III.
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III. The Errors of FAIR
I have suggested that FAIR may not have been wrong in result
but that both its tone and rationale are wrong. Let me explain what
I mean.
A. The Cultural Backdrop and the Court’s Tone
Powerful legal, cultural, and political issues tugged at the justices
in FAIR. The litigation over the Solomon Amendment lay at the
intersection of three great controversies in modern American law
and life.
First, there are the needs of the military to recruit the best and
brightest in a time of war and uncertainty about national security.
The schools’ decisions to exclude military recruiters would never
be a very popular one—less so in present circumstances. To many,
universities’ exclusion of the military looks like the action of an elite
cast completely disconnected from the needs and ethos of the nation
in which they live.
Second, the case was set in the context of the ongoing cultural
struggle over whether discrimination against gays is ever acceptable
and, if so, under what circumstances. To the schools, the exclusion
of the military recruiters is a way to defend their moral view that
discrimination against gays in the military is wrong and allowing
recruitment by those who discriminate on this basis is contrary to
their professional standards. FAIR’s reliance on Dale, which held
that gays could be excluded from an association, to justify excluding
those who exclude gays was an especially ironic note in the litigation.
Third, the case raised questions about the extent of government
power over the lives of its citizens and of the continuing vitality
of federalism—the relationship between the states and the federal
government—both of which I have already discussed. Government
power to suppress constitutional rights has historically taken the
form of old-fashioned compulsion: for example, a threat of jail for
failure to abide by the government’s command. However, in an age
of vast federal spending, government power to compel conduct is
more likely to take the form of conditions placed on that spending.
When that form of compulsion affects state institutions, like a state
university, the central question ceases to be simply about the relationship between the federal government and the individual citizen
(or associations) and begins to be about the relationship between
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the federal government and the states. Not surprisingly, the Cato
Institute filed an amicus brief on the side of the law schools.38
With such momentous cultural and legal issues at stake, we
needed something more than an opinion that treats the liberty claims
almost with contempt. The problems with the Court’s tone start
with its recitation of the facts. In the course of describing the litigation
below and the evolution of the Solomon Amendment, the Court
included this sentence:
Although the statute required only ‘‘entry to campuses,’’ the
Government—after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001—
adopted an informal policy of ‘‘‘requir[ing] universities to
provide military recruiters access to students equal in quality
and scope to that provided to other recruiters.’’’39

This passage might lead the uninformed reader, not familiar with
the case, to conclude that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
actually had something to do with the decision of ‘‘the Government’’
to expand the scope of the Solomon Amendment to add an ‘‘equal
treatment’’ requirement to the preexisting statutory access requirement. Perhaps, one might speculate, the government foresaw
increased personnel needs after 9/11 and, to protect the nation from
future attacks, decided it needed to step up its recruitment in law
schools. That sounds plausible, but there is one large problem with
it. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Solomon Amendment
actually addressed any recruitment problem or that it was really
intended to do so. There is similarly no evidence that the government
was addressing any problem arising from 9/11 when it decided to
expand the reach of the Solomon Amendment.
Why does the Court slip this non sequitur about 9/11 into the
opinion? It is not simply a factual claim that the new equal-treatment
policy chronologically followed 9/11, although it did. It is meant
to suggest a causal relationship between the expanded Solomon
Amendment and 9/11, a relationship for which there is no evidence.
References like this to 9/11 are a modern echo of the old World
War II quip, ‘‘Don’t you know there’s a war on?’’ On the one hand,
these sorts of statements try to silence serious critics of government
38

Amicus Curiae Brief of the Cato Institute in Support of Respondents, Rumsfeld
v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006) (No. 04-1152).
39
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1303 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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policy by suggesting ever so lightly that they are either unpatriotic
or foolishly oblivious to security needs. On the other hand, they
reflect the Court’s unthinking acceptance of almost any security
claim made by the government. While the Court has always been
deferential to Congress’ judgment about military needs, this deference in cases like FAIR becomes almost complete submission.
By contrast, the Court nowhere discusses the enormous financial
stakes for universities that bar military recruiters. Instead, the Court
adopts the government’s misleading description of the money as
‘‘specified federal funding.’’ 40 Yes, specific federal money for
research and other things is lost if part of a university bars military
recruiters: almost all of it.
The Court also fails to recognize the importance of antidiscrimination norms and policies in universities. The Court believes nothing
very important is lost when these norms and policies are eroded,
that is, when law students, faculty, and administrators must accept
the presence of anti-gay discrimination in their midst. The law
schools must make their facilities available to an employer—a representative of the state, no less—that refuses even to consider the
merits of some of their students on a ground that the law schools
believe is invidious and purposeless.
Yet this affront to the dignity of their students and erosion of their
policies barely registers with a Court swooning before the wholly
unsubstantiated needs of post-9/11 national security. The Court
variously describes the interests and liberty at stake as ‘‘minimal,’’41
a ‘‘far cry’’ from recognized interests,42 ‘‘incidental,’’43 ‘‘trivializ[ing]’’
important freedoms, 44 ‘‘plainly overstat[ed],’’ 45 and ‘‘exaggerat[ed].’’46 The Court’s opinion is an exercise in single-entry bookkeeping. The only interests that count are the government’s unsupported
ones. On both the insubstantiality of the schools’ interests and on

40
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the substantiality of the governments’, the Court’s tone echoes the
popular reaction to the case.
B. Minimizing Free Speech
On the substantive question of whether the schools enjoyed a
constitutional right to exclude military recruiters, the Court rejected
three different speech claims raised by FAIR. According to the Court,
schools are not ‘‘compelled’’ by the law to say anything very important,47 are not objectionably required to host the speech of the government within their own forum,48 and are not denied their right to
engage in expressive conduct.49 In each case, the Court arguably
narrowed its precedents, limiting the reach of free-speech rights.
1. Compelled Speech
The First Amendment forbids the government to make citizens
its mouthpiece. The most famous case announcing this idea is West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,50 which upheld the right
of schoolchildren to refuse to salute the flag or to recite the Pledge
of Allegiance. Barnette, it should be remembered, is one of the few
cases where the Court actually held its ground in defending liberty,
in the middle of World War II no less, against the state’s claims that
the needs of national unity are paramount. Canonical now, Barnette
was controversial in 1943, requiring the Court to overrule one of its
own precedents from just three years earlier.51 A FAIR-minded court
might have noted that ‘‘West Virginia defends its policy—in the
aftermath of the Japanese sneak attack of December 7, 1941—as a
way to promote the war effort.’’
Next to the forced recitation of a statement of principles drafted
by the government, it must be admitted that the degree of compelled
speech required by the Solomon Amendment is fairly light. Under
it, law schools are required to include in emails and other notices
factual statements about the presence and location of military recruiters on campus, just as they do for other recruiters. Here, as elsewhere,

47
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law schools are a lot less sympathetic than Jehovah’s Witnesses
schoolchildren.
But Barnette was extended in Wooley v. Maynard52 to allow motorists
to cover up a state motto on their license plates. The license plates
did not literally compel motorists to ‘‘say’’ anything at all. And no
reasonable person would understand that a motorist was endorsing
the state’s message (‘‘Live Free or Die’’) simply because it appeared
on a standard state-issued license plate. But the Court concluded
that even this amounted to compelled speech since the law ‘‘in
effect requires that appellees use their private property as a ‘mobile
billboard’ for the State’s ideological message—or suffer a penalty
. . . .’’ 53 The same appears to be the case in FAIR. The Solomon
Amendment in effect requires the law schools to use their private
property for the state’s message—or suffer a penalty. And it does
not matter, as the Court acknowledges, that the statements required
of the law school are factual rather than ideological.54
The Court tries to get around these uncomfortable precedents in
a couple of ways. First, it argues that the Solomon Amendment
does not dictate the content of the compelled speech, and certainly
requires nothing akin to a state-prescribed pledge or state motto.
The schools must only communicate for the military the type of
matters, if any, that they communicate for other employers.55 If a
school announces by school-wide email that the law firm of Scrooge
& Marley will interview interested students in Room 1 at noon, it
must also announce in a school-wide email where and when the
military will interview interested students. If the law school makes
no such announcement for other employers, it need say nothing for
the benefit of military recruiters. The Solomon Amendment thus
employs a triggering mechanism for compelled speech, where Barnette and Wooley actually dictated specific content.
This is a distinction, yes, but one that has previously made no
difference in the Court’s precedents. In Miami Herald Publishing Co.
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430 U.S. 705 (1977).
Id. at 715.
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v. Tornillo,56 the state similarly employed a triggering mechanism that
required newspapers to publish replies to criticism that appeared in
the newspaper. Like the Solomon Amendment, nothing in Florida’s
right-of-reply law mandated that newspapers engage in any speech
at all (absent the trigger), and nothing in the statute required specific
content in the compelled speech once triggered. Like the Solomon
Amendment, nothing in the Florida law prohibited the newspapers
from expressing their own views on any subject. They could ‘‘ameliorate’’ the presence of the unwanted reply from aggrieved politicians.
Nevertheless, the Tornillo Court held that the law was unconstitutional because it ‘‘exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of
[the] newspaper.’’57 Applying this principle to Wooley, does anyone
believe that the case would have come out differently had New
Hampshire required motorists’ license plates to bear the state motto
only if they affixed other messages to their car bumpers?
The Court is not obliged to stand by its precedents, and it can of
course limit them. Wooley, in particular, may be a stretch of the
compelled speech doctrine to cover a truly trivial intrusion on private
conscience and speech. Perhaps the Court should overrule it. But
the logistical and informational speech compelled by the Solomon
Amendment is hardly a ‘‘far cry’’ from the appearance of four words
on a standard state-issued license plate.
The Court also distinguished Barnette and Wooley by arguing that
‘‘[t]he compelled speech to which the law schools point is plainly
incidental to the Solomon Amendment’s regulation of conduct[, the
admission of military recruiters] . . . .’’58 The Court gives the example of Title VII, which forbids private employers to discriminate on
the basis of race and would, therefore, require an employer to remove
a ‘‘White Applicants Only’’ sign from its premises.59 In both the
Solomon Amendment and Title VII, argues the Court, the limitation
of speech is incidental to the conduct regulation. But this analogy
does not work.
It is true that speech facilitating illegality is not protected simply
because it is speech. A perjurer’s perjury may be admitted against
56
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him as evidence of his crime. But it is equally true that the government cannot suppress protected speech simply because the underlying or accompanying conduct can be made illegal. Advocating law
violation cannot be made criminal simply because law violation
itself can be. Much more is required before speech advocating law
violation may be punished60
The key distinction between these two truisms of First Amendment law, I think, is whether the suppression of speech really is
incidental to the larger purpose and impact of the law. Whether that
is so depends on (1) what we think of the substantiality of the
expressive component of the conduct being regulated—the ban on
recruiters who discriminate—and on (2) whether we think the government’s real interest in regulating the conduct is speech-related,
that is, an attempt to suppress some message being sent by the
conduct. For reasons I explain below, I think both of these considerations cut in favor of the law schools. For now, it is enough to say
that these are hard questions not answered by a quick analogy to
Title VII.
2. Third-Party Speech
Closer than Barnette or Wooley to the actual facts of FAIR are a
series of cases in which the Court has ‘‘limited the government’s
ability to force one speaker to host or accommodate another speaker’s message.’’61 The Solomon Amendment requires law schools to
host government speakers—military recruiters—who use space for
interviews in the law school to promote the government’s own messages about the desirability of military service, to defend DADT,
and to object to the law schools’ views. The interviews themselves
are quintessential speech activities in which ideas and information
are exchanged.62
60
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The Court distinguishes the third-party compelled-speech cases
in a couple of ways. First, it argues that a constitutional violation has
previously been recognized only where ‘‘the complaining speaker’s
own message was affected by the speech it was forced to accommodate.’’63 But this is not a fair way to distinguish the cases. Tornillo,
involving the politicians’ right-of-reply in newspapers, ‘‘affected’’
the newspapers only because they could have used the space for
some other speech purpose.64 The same is true of the law schools,
whose interview and other spaces are taken up by military recruiters
whose messages they object to.
The Court further argues that the law schools’ speech is not
affected by the presence of military recruiters because ‘‘the schools
are not speaking when they host interviews and recruiting receptions.’’65 These activities, argues the Court, are not ‘‘inherently
expressive,’’ unlike a parade, a newsletter, or a newspaper.66 This
conclusion is parasitic on the Court’s discussion of expressive conduct, which I address below.67 It is enough here to say that the
Court’s conclusion betrays how little it appreciates the important
expressive nature of antidiscrimination policies that embody a
school’s commitment to its vision of morality, ethical conduct, and
professionalism. Perhaps the government has non-speech-related
interests sufficient to override these expressive interests, but to deny
that the expressive interests are even present is blindness.
Finally, the Court rejects FAIR’s argument that the law schools
might be perceived as endorsing the government’s message if military recruiters are allowed into their buildings.68 The perception of
endorsement is indeed unlikely since the law schools have loudly
and consistently objected to the presence of recruiters who discriminate. Reasonably informed observers, like law students, will surely
understand that the schools are simply complying with the law.
This endorsement argument gives the Court the opportunity to make
fun of the law schools. High school students can tell the difference
63
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between messages the schools endorse and those they are required
to carry, notes the Court. ‘‘Surely students have not lost that ability
by the time they get to law school,’’ the Court quips in a passage
greeted with much mirth by opponents of FAIR.69
No knowledgeable observer will think law schools endorse antigay discrimination simply because they must permit military recruiters on campus or even include announcements of their presence in
emails and other notices. The confusion will be even less likely if
the law schools engage in the sort of ameliorative counter-speech
the Court reassures us they are free to engage in.
But this fact should make no difference to the compelled-speech
claim. Nobody would understand the motorist in Wooley necessarily
to endorse any message that appears on his and everybody else’s
license plate. Nobody would confuse the politician’s right-of-reply
op-ed with a newspaper’s own viewpoint in Tornillo. Under the
compelled-speech doctrine, the vice of the law is in the requirement
that the speaker host a third party’s objectionable message, not necessarily in any confusion this might create about whether the complaining speaker endorses the third party’s message. It is always true,
even in the context of a parade, that the complaining speaker may
distance itself from the third party’s message in various ways. The
law schools thus correctly lost what should have been an irrelevant point.
3. Expressive Conduct
Most disconcerting for free speech is the Court’s mistreatment
of the ‘‘expressive conduct’’ doctrine. The Court has never had a
satisfying theory of what conduct should get free-speech protection.
Conduct can be engaged in for essentially expressive purposes; when
it does, speech interests are present. At the same time, when the
government regulates conduct it is unusually likely to have interests
unrelated to the suppression of ideas.
Some conduct, like flag-burning70 and nude dancing,71 does get
some level of constitutional protection. Some conduct, like sexual
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activity in an adult bookstore,72 does not. Obviously some conduct,
like burning a flag in protest, is such a potent way to express a view
that its First Amendment significance cannot be missed. Even words
could not adequately convey the power of publicly burning a flag
in protest. Yet we would not want to subject all criminal laws to
First Amendment scrutiny simply because the defendant claims that
he was trying to communicate something by his conduct.
a. From Context-Specific to Context-Free
Different verbal formulations have been offered to explain the
distinction between conduct that gets some protection from conduct
that gets none, but these attempts have always been indeterminate.
In Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., the Court suggested that conduct would
get some First Amendment protection where it contained ‘‘a significant expressive element.’’73 In Spence v. Washington, which reversed
a conviction for affixing a peace symbol to the flag under a state
law prohibiting ‘‘improper use’’ of the flag, the Court suggested
that expressive conduct would be protected where there was ‘‘[a]n
intent to convey a particularized message’’ and ‘‘in the surrounding
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it.’’74 The Court relied on the Spence
formulation in Texas v. Johnson, in which it reversed a conviction
under state law for burning a flag in protest during the Republican
National Convention.75 However, the Court seemed to disavow part
of the Spence formulation in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, saying that: ‘‘[A] narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection,
which if confined to expressions conveying a ‘particularized message’ would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse
of Lewis Carroll.’’76
Now, says the Court: ‘‘[W]e have extended First Amendment
protection only to conduct that is inherently expressive.’’77 The Court
72
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cites no precedent for this conclusion or for the phrase ‘‘inherently
expressive.’’ No prior majority opinion on the subject has suggested
that in deciding whether conduct is expressive we should look only
at the conduct itself, rather than at both the conduct and the context
in which it occurs. It is notable that in its discussion of expressive
conduct, the FAIR decision makes no reference to the Spence/Johnson
or Arcara tests for what conduct could count as expressive.
While the words ‘‘inherently expressive’’ appeared in the plurality
opinion in a nude dancing case, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,78 the
plurality used it there in a sense opposite what the FAIR Court uses
it for. In Pap’s A.M., the Court explained that ‘‘[b]eing ‘in a state of
nudity’ is not an inherently expressive condition’’ but that, nevertheless, ‘‘nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct
. . . .’’79 The Pap’s A.M. plurality thought that nude dancing could
be protected by the First Amendment as expressive conduct despite
the fact that it is not inherently expressive. Now we have a unanimous Supreme Court endorsing the opposite and far more restrictive view.
Certainly Johnson and Hurley considered the context in which
conduct occurs. In Johnson, the Court observed that the act occurred
‘‘as part—indeed, as the culmination—of a political demonstration
that coincided with the convening of the Republican Party and its
renomination of Ronald Reagan for President.’’80 In Hurley, the Court
found a parade expressive in part because it involves actual speech
(e.g., slogans on banners), but also because it involves spectators
lining the streets, people marching in costumes and uniforms, marching bands, pipers, and floats.81
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b. What Is ‘‘Inherently Expressive’’ Conduct?
Beyond the unprecedented nature of the Court’s restrictive view,
it is difficult to predict what conduct will count as ‘‘inherently
expressive,’’ and thus get First Amendment protection, and what
conduct will not be deemed ‘‘inherently expressive,’’ and thus get no
First Amendment protection. I am not sure the distinction amounts to
much more than the old informal obscenity standard, ‘‘I know it
when I see it,’’ in which case it has further unsettled an already
uncertain area of First Amendment law.
The Court appears to mean that inherently expressive conduct is
that conduct for which the expressive component is ‘‘‘overwhelmingly apparent,’’’82 and thus needs no further accompanying speech
or consideration of circumstances in which it occurs to signal that
it is expressive. Barring military recruiters is ‘‘expressive only
because the law schools accompanied their conduct with speech
explaining it’’ and thus fails the newly created ‘‘inherently expressive’’ test. The test, the Court thinks, helps us separate flag burning
(inherently expressive) from the exclusion of the military from law
school recruiting (not inherently expressive). As the Court puts it:
An observer who sees military recruiters interviewing away
from the law school has no way of knowing whether the
law school is expressing its disapproval of the military, all
the law school’s interview rooms are full, or the military
recruiters decided for reasons of their own that they would
rather interview someplace else.83

The Court here mishandles existing doctrine and does so in a way
that narrows First Amendment freedom. We do not know much
about the message any conduct conveys, or whether it conveys any
message at all, unless we know the context in which it occurs. Yes,
as the Court suggests, a law school’s exclusion of the military could
signal disagreement with some governmental or military policy, like
DADT (expressive), or it could merely reflect that the law school
ran out of space for interviews (not expressive).
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Yet applying this context-free methodology to Johnson, an observer
who sees someone burning a flag might think the flag-burner is
expressing disagreement with the nation’s foreign policy (expressive), or that he accidentally set it on fire (not expressive), or that
he was attempting to generate heat in the cold (not expressive), or
that he was simply disposing of a tattered flag in the manner prescribed by the government (not expressive?). Applying the FAIR
methodology to Hurley, the observer might think this group of people walking in the street are doing so because the sidewalks are
under repair (not expressive), or because they are from Mars and
do not know any better (not expressive), or because they are part
of a group celebrating Irish pride on St. Patrick’s Day (expressive).
Context, including what the actor says about his conduct, matters.
The uninformed observer, unaware of context, could not tell whether
any particular act was expressive. So it should not matter that a few
‘‘listeners’’ or ‘‘observers,’’ who might as well be living on a different
planet, cannot appreciate why the law schools want to exclude military recruiters until they are told why. In fact, in the current environment of heightened sensitivity to law school recruitment policies,
the reasonably informed observer has a good idea why a law school
might want to exclude the military. Even if in principle we could
draw a line between protected conduct and unprotected conduct
that would leave schools’ recruitment policies outside the protected
realm, the Court’s discussion of this question is troubling.
If Chief Justice Roberts had used the Spence two-pronged test
(repeated in Johnson), for example, he would have asked whether
there had been ‘‘an intent to convey a message’’ and whether that
message ‘‘in the surrounding circumstances’’ would have been understood by those who viewed it. The answer in the context of the
law schools’ recruitment policies should have been ‘‘yes’’ to both
questions. The law schools certainly intended their policies to convey
a message to students, to faculty, to the community, and to the
government, that they deeply disapprove of DADT. (That is a controversial moral view, but the law schools are entitled to hold and
promote it.) Under the circumstances, in which the media, the courts,
and numerous critics debated the law schools’ policies, and the law
schools themselves explained the need for their recruitment policies,
this message-sending would be understood by those made aware
of it. Using the Spence/Johnson test, the Solomon Amendment does
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indeed ‘‘limit[] what law schools may say,’’84 contrary to the conclusion in FAIR, by prohibiting their expressive conduct.
c. The Government’s Interest in the Solomon Amendment
Even if barring military recruiters is expressive conduct, this conclusion alone does not mean the Solomon Amendment is unconstitutional. In the past, in expressive conduct cases, the Court has asked
whether the government’s interest in regulating the expressive conduct is related to speech. If so, strict scrutiny applies; if not, a very
relaxed form of intermediate scrutiny applies.85 Unfortunately, the
Court has not told us how to determine Congress’ ‘‘interest’’ in
legislation. The analysis surely does not call for an inquiry into
legislators’ subjective motives, of which there are undoubtedly
many. But it also cannot mean simply taking the government’s word
for it when its lawyers identify an interest. Instead, it would seem
to call for an objective inquiry based on the nature of the claimed
interest, its plausibility, the circumstances in which the legislation
was adopted, and the statutory text.
Using these considerations as a guide, is the government’s interest
in the Solomon Amendment related to expression? The government
claimed in litigation that the Solomon Amendment was an exercise
of Congress’ power to raise and support the military, and the Court
accordingly gave substantial deference to its ‘‘judgment’’ about military needs.86 The problem with this claimed recruitment need is that
it has no support. There is no evidence of the effect of law schools’
antidiscrimination policies on recruitment. There is no evidence,
for example, that the JAG Corps was having any difficulty finding
excellent officers. Instead, there has been a glut of highly qualified
applicants. In fact, the Department of Defense initially opposed the
Solomon Amendment as ‘‘unnecessary’’ and ‘‘duplicative,’’ 87
although it later reversed its position. As the Solomon Amendment
grew in later years, no evidence on actual recruitment needs was
84

Id. at 1307 (arguing that the Solomon Amendment does not limit what law schools
may say).
85
Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403.
86
126 S. Ct. at 1311 (‘‘judgment’’ about the means to meet military recruitment
needs is for Congress, not the courts). Elsewhere the Court describes Congress’ power
over military affairs as ‘‘broad and sweeping.’’ Id. at 1306.
87
140 Cong. Rec. 11,440 (1994) (statement of Rep. Underwood).
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ever produced. The military has so many other methods of recruiting
law students that forcing law schools to allow interviews to occur
on campus, and forcing them to make announcements about military
recruiting, has never been needed.
If not filling recruitment needs, what was the government’s interest in the Solomon Amendment? It seems to have been entirely
symbolic, arising out of a desire to punish the ‘‘starry-eyed idealism’’
of academic elites who think ‘‘they are too good—or too righteous—
to treat our Nation’s military with the respect it deserves.’’88 Recall
that almost two decades passed between the time schools began
excluding military recruiters and the time Congress reacted, a fact
that undermines (but by itself does not defeat) a claimed recruitment
need. Recall also that the Solomon Amendment was passed in the
immediate aftermath of the controversy over gays in the military,
which brought fresh attention to the issue. In this charged atmosphere, in which Congress had just asserted itself forcefully to codify
the gay ban, members of Congress perceived law school policies
aimed at anti-gay discrimination by the military as a ‘‘backhanded
slap at the honor and dignity of service in our Nation’s Armed
Forces.’’89 Rep. Solomon himself wanted to ‘‘tell[] recipients of Federal money at colleges and universities that if you do not like the
Armed Forces, if you do not like its policies . . . do not expect Federal
dollars to support your interference with our military recruiters.’’90
The Solomon Amendment would ‘‘send a message over the wall of
the ivory tower of higher education.’’91
These statements and others, as well as the two-decade delay in
reacting to the schools’ policies and the context in which the law
was adopted, provide objective evidence of an ideological interest
in passage of the Solomon Amendment. It is an interest based on
hostility toward universities and their faculties and a desire to punish
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Id. at 11,441 (1994) (statement of Rep. Pombo).
Id.
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Id. at 11,439 (statement of Rep. Solomon). Ironically, Rep. Solomon thought universities had a ‘‘first-amendment right[]’’ to bar military recruiters, but that Congress
could condition funds on their choosing not to do so. Id. In this, Rep. Solomon
had a more expansive view of First Amendment freedom than does the current
Supreme Court.
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Id. at 11,441 (statement of Rep. Pombo).
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them for their views—an interest deeply at odds with First Amendment principles. Congress’ interest was therefore speech-related and
ought to draw strict scrutiny.
I am not asserting that Congress had a single motive in passing
the Solomon Amendment or even that an inquiry into subjective
motives is necessary. Some members of Congress undoubtedly genuinely believed that the law would aid recruiting. But in this case,
where there is no objective evidence to support Congress’ claimed
recruitment interest, and there is objective evidence supporting a
speech-related interest, the ideological interest is the one that ought
to be attributed to Congress. Simply to give Congress a free pass,
accepting any interest that its lawyers concoct without any further
examination in a case where there is objective evidence of a speechrelated interest, would be to seriously weaken the expressive-conduct doctrine. Yet that appears to be what the Court did.
C. Minimizing the Freedom of Association
The First Amendment protects a freedom of association that
extends to expressive groups.92 FAIR, relying heavily on Dale, argued
that this freedom protects the right of law schools to exclude military
recruiters. The government argued for a narrow interpretation of
Dale and other freedom of association cases as applying only to
government control over a group’s membership.
There was much irony in the dispute over the meaning of Dale
as it applied to the Solomon Amendment controversy. Some of the
same people who criticized Dale as ‘‘anti-gay’’ six years before relied
on it to make an aggressive claim about associational rights. Of
course, the irony went both ways. Some conservatives who hailed
Dale as a great victory for freedom six years before now argued for
a very narrow interpretation of it.

92
Explicit protection for the freedom of association came first in NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), which recognized a right of a civil rights group to keep its
membership list confidential from the state of Alabama. The Court has subsequently
described the freedom as extending to expressive associations in cases like Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640 (2000).
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One reaction to FAIR’s claim might have been to note that insofar
as recruitment interviews facilitate commercial transactions—the
meeting of employer and prospective employee—these activities are
not strongly protected by the freedom of association.93 The Court
makes a nod to this possibility when it says that recruiting services
lack ‘‘expressive quality’’ because the schools are merely ‘‘assist[ing]
their students in obtaining jobs.’’94 If the Court had rejected the
freedom of association claim on the ground that recruiting is a
commercial activity not protected by the freedom of association, it
would have been a defensible interpretation and application of its
precedents. Instead, the Court ventured into new territory.
1. The Freedom of Association and Membership
Does the freedom of association protect, as the government contended, only the membership decisions a group makes? Or does it
encompass, as the schools contended, a broader right that protects
many associational activities by which a group promotes its message? If it is the former, the freedom of association is not a very
robust doctrine, since it leaves the state free to hobble a group’s
message in numerous indirect but nevertheless very effective ways.
If it is the latter, the freedom of association risks giving expressive
groups a broad right to refuse to comply with general regulations
backed by important state interests. It would be the freedom that
swallowed the law.
While one scholar pre-FAIR questioned whether law schools qualified as expressive associations,95 the government did not contest this
issue and the Court was not detained by it. Under Dale, a group is
expressive even if disseminating ideas is not its primary purpose.
It simply needs to engage in expressive activity in order to qualify
for protection.96 Law schools meet that threshold, even if they have
93

Dale Carpenter, Expressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale:
A Tripartite Approach, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 1515, 1576–80 (2001) (quasi-expressive associations should be protected by the freedom of association in their expressive activities,
but not in their commercial activities).
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Rumsfeld v. FAIR, 126 S. Ct. 1297, 1310 (2006).
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Morriss, supra note 8 (arguing that law schools operate primarily as economic
cartels, not as expressive associations).
96
Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 (‘‘[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the ‘purpose’
of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that
could be impaired in order to be entitled to protection.’’).
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other, economic purposes, and even if these other purposes are the
dominant ones.
After deciding that a group is expressive, Dale instructs us to ask
whether the law or regulation about which it complains would
‘‘significantly affect its expression.’’97 One way to answer this question would be to take a hard-and-fast categorical approach: if the
law regulates group membership, as did the antidiscrimination law
in Dale by requiring the Boy Scouts to admit an openly gay scoutmaster, it ‘‘significantly affects’’ the group’s expression. If the law does
not regulate group membership, then it does not ‘‘significantly
affect’’ group expression. The government took this categorical position in FAIR, arguing that the freedom of expressive association
protects only a group’s membership decisions, and that since the
Solomon Amendment did not require the schools to admit military
recruiters as ‘‘members’’ (presumably, as faculty, students, administrators, or staff) the law did not violate their freedom of association.
The FAIR Court correctly rejected that view, agreeing with the
law schools that ‘‘the freedom of expressive association protects
more than just a group’s membership decisions.’’98 This comports
with the Court’s cases, which have extended the freedom of association beyond control of group membership.99
A second way to answer whether a law significantly affects an
association’s expression would be case-by-case and contextualized,
examining the particular ways a regulation might impair a group’s
ability to get its message across, no matter whether the law regulated
or affected group membership. The Court appears to have eschewed
that approach as well.
Instead of these two possible approaches, the FAIR decision opts
for a third, giving us what we might call a hybrid categoricalcontextual approach. Laws regulating membership—usually antidiscrimination laws that control the membership criteria a group might
want to use—certainly may significantly affect an association’s
97

Id. at 655–59.
126 S. Ct. at 1312.
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See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169
(1972); Brown v. Socialist Workers ‘74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
In Dale, the Court observed that unconstitutional restrictions on the freedom of
association ‘‘may take many forms,’’ not simply control of a group’s membership.
530 U.S. at 648.
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expression.100 But the Court adds that laws may also significantly
affect an association’s expression if they ‘‘mak[e] group membership
less desirable.’’101 Laws that impose penalties for group membership
or that require the disclosure of secret membership lists are examples
falling into this category. They make membership in the expressive
association less attractive.
This synthesis of the Court’s association jurisprudence has not
previously appeared in its decisions. Prior to FAIR, the Court had
worried primarily about the effect a regulation might have on the
group’s ability to get across its message, however that impediment
operated. Now the focus of associational freedom seems to have
been narrowed to concerns about membership or effects on membership that in turn may affect the group’s message.
So while the FAIR decision states that associational freedom protects more than a group’s membership, in substance it has announced
a test for protecting associational freedom that is limited to membership concerns. Thus, the Court holds that the schools have failed to
show that ‘‘the statute affects the composition of the group by making group membership less desirable.’’102 The whole point of the
schools’ claim was that having to host a message they regard as
repugnant would impair their own message that discrimination
against gay Americans is wrong, regardless of whether compliance
had any impact on their ‘‘membership.’’ The Court rejects this claim
by saying, in effect, ‘‘Show us how compliance would affect your
message by affecting your group’s membership.’’ It concludes this
by narrowly reading prior associational-freedom cases as involving
laws that ‘‘did not directly interfere’’ with membership, but which
‘‘made group membership less attractive.’’103 There is notably no
citation or quotation supporting this narrower reading of the scope
of associational freedom. Perhaps the Court’s attempt to cabin the
reach of associational freedom in FAIR is defensible, but it does
seem a more restrictive view than it has taken in the past.
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Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S 609 (1984) (state law forbidding sex discrimination); Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (state law forbidding sexual orientation discrimination).
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Am I being unfair to FAIR? Perhaps this new description of the
freedom of association is more expansive than I am suggesting. Any
law or regulation that makes the group less attractive to potential
members, much less a law that directly regulates group membership,
will potentially infringe its freedom of association. A law school
could argue in the next case, for example, that the presence of military recruiters interviewing in its building might make it less attractive to students, staff, administrators, and faculty who prefer a discrimination-free environment.
2. Deference No More
But even if that is factually correct and supportable, I expect the
law schools would still lose their claim. The reason they would lose
this hypothetical future claim tells us something else significant
about FAIR that may not be obvious on a first reading. It is not
obvious because what is important here is not what the decision
says, but what it does not say.
Consider that the Dale Court explicitly deferred to the Boy Scouts
on both the question of the content of the group’s message and the
question of what would impair that message. ‘‘As we give deference to
an association’s assertions regarding the nature of its expression,
we must also give deference to an association’s view of what would
impair its expression,’’ said the Dale Court.104 That deferential posture
is completely missing from the FAIR decision both in rhetoric and
in substance. The omission seems deliberate, since the Court quotes
parts of the very next sentence from Dale about how a group cannot
‘‘‘erect a shield’’’ against the law ‘‘‘simply by asserting’’’ their expression will be impaired by compliance with it.105
Rather than deferring to the law schools about what impairs their
expression, the Court almost mocks their claims: ‘‘The law schools
say that allowing military recruiters equal access impairs their own
expression by requiring them to associate with the recruiters . . . .’’106
The emphasis on ‘‘say’’ is the Court’s own, as if we would be foolish
to trust a group’s stated judgment about what would impair its
expression (the way we trusted the Boy Scouts of America in Dale).
104

Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
FAIR, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
106
Id. (emphasis in original).
105

252

Unanimously Wrong
While a group must surely do more than say compliance with a law
would significantly impair its message, the schools did do more than
that here107 —and still lost. Thus, deference is replaced by skepticism.
An alternative and more hopeful reading of FAIR might be this:
Perhaps the Court is saying that where a law neither regulates group
membership nor affects group composition by making membership
less attractive, the Court will not defer to the association’s judgment
that compliance with the law will significantly affect its expression.
Where a law either regulates membership or makes membership
less attractive, the Court will continue to defer to the group’s judgment that compliance will significantly affect its expression.
If that is the line the Court intends to draw, it is a sensible one.
There is, after all, something especially sensitive about control over
associational membership that goes directly to the group’s ability
to control its own message. Deference on the question of message
impairment where membership is altered by the government may
be the appropriate judicial mechanism by which this sensitivity is
registered. Deference outside this especially sensitive question of
membership control risks making the freedom of association an
exemption from laws that any group simply does not like.
But I doubt this is the line the Court intended to draw. Instead,
the opinion makes no reference to deference, mentions only effects
on membership, and closes with the bare observation that a recruiter’s ‘‘mere presence on campus does not violate a law school’s right
to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school considers
the recruiter’s message.’’108 The freedom of association, concludes
the FAIR Court, is untroubled by the government’s insistence that
its representatives be present on the association’s property while
delivering a ‘‘message’’ contradicting the association’s own.
Conclusion
One could support the Court’s result in FAIR—that the Solomon
Amendment is constitutional—while still being quite concerned
about the decision’s potential narrowing effects on First Amendment
freedoms. The upshot of the Court’s view about free speech and
107
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associational rights is this: the government could require schools to
admit military recruiters under threat of criminal sanction, not
merely withdraw funds from schools that bar the recruiters. The
state may mandate that its representatives be present, that they be
allowed to deliver messages directly contrary to the association’s
own, and that the association must not only tolerate their presence
but affirmatively assist in and facilitate the state’s opposing speech.
That Congress chose not to do so in the Solomon Amendment is
now a matter of legislative grace, not constitutional freedom. Prior
to the decision, even many supporters of the Solomon Amendment
agreed that the government could not go so far.109 On this basis
alone, the FAIR decision should concern anyone devoted to First
Amendment freedom.
As a practical matter, the ruling changes nothing in the steps
many schools have taken to ‘‘ameliorate’’ the presence of military
recruiters by, for example, hosting fora on the military’s policy on the
day military recruiters are present, or posting notices of opposition to
the presence of discrimination on campus, even outside the door
where military recruiters are interviewing. In fact, the decision
appears to give a bright green light to these efforts that some schools
may have avoided until now for fear they would lose funding. From
the opinion:
Law schools remain free under the statute to express whatever views they may have on the military’s congressionally
mandated employment policy, all the while retaining eligibility for federal funds. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 25 (Solicitor General
acknowledging that law schools ‘‘could put signs on the
bulletin board next to the door, they could engage in speech,
they could help organize student protests’’).110
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In a debate with me on the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment held
at the University of Minnesota Law School on September 25, 2005, my renowned
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because such a requirement would violate the First Amendment. Professor Paulsen
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There was some concern among law school faculties considering
amelioration before FAIR that posting these notices and engaging
in other ameliorative activities might be considered a violation of
the Solomon Amendment because it denied military recruiters access
to their facilities that was ‘‘equal’’ to the access given other employers
(against whom they do not protest).111 As a matter of statutory construction, that worry should be over.
On the other hand, while Congress probably could not directly
prohibit these amelioration activities, the question remains after
FAIR whether Congress could condition federal funds on a school’s
agreement not to ameliorate the presence of military recruiters while
they are interviewing. After all, the schools are only losing money,
and besides, don’t they know there’s a war on?

111
‘‘[T]he military has routinely threatened law schools for any gesture of protest
that treats military recruiters differently, even if the difference could have no material
effect on recruiting efforts.’’ Respondents’ Brief, supra note 15, at 8 (giving examples).
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